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engaged in activities appropriate to their age, experience, and wisdom,
it would be unfair to the public to permit a minor in the operation of
a motor vehicle to observe any other standards of care and conduct
than those expected of all others .... 17

In view of the large number of automobiles in California, their
danger to the public at large, and the fact that the Legislature has
established certain qualifications and safety measures binding on all
drivers regardless of age, it is unrealistic, contrary to expressed legislative policy, and inimical to the public safety to permit minors a
more lenient standard of care.
A member of the traveling public has the right to expect that others
using our highways, regardless of their age and experience, will obey
the traffic laws and exercise the adult standard of ordinary care. 18

Thomas Hansen

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: NEGLIGENT
CO-EMPLOYEE'S PERSONAL LIABILITY
DEFINED: SAALA V. McFARLAND (CAL. 1965)
In Saala v. McFarland' the California Supreme Court interprets section 3601 of the Labor Code' so that a negligent co-employee
can be held personally liable for his tort even though the injured
party also obtains relief under the California Workmen's Compensation statutes.' Plaintiff Saala and defendant McFarland worked
for a common employer who provided a parking lot for the convenience of his employees. At the end of a shift plaintiff was struck
by defendant's car while both were still in the employer's parking
area. Plaintiff recovered workmen's compensation benefits and in
addition brought an action for negligence against defendant. The
trial court granted a summary judgment for the defendant and the
First District Court of Appeals affirmed.4 In reversing this judgment,
the Supreme Court introduced its opinion by stating:
Even though plaintiff properly received workmen's compensation
benefits since her injury was one "arising out of and in the course of
the employment" (Lab. Code, § 3600), summary judgment must be
17 Id. at -, 107 N.W.2d at 863.
18 Neudeck v. Bransten, 233 A.C.A. 1, 7, 43 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254 (1965).
1 63 A.C. 120, 403 P.2d 400, 45 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1965).
2 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3601.

3 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3201-6240.
4 Saala v. McFarland, 231 A.C.A. 22, 41 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1964).
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reversed because the trial court erred in concluding that the provisions
of section 3601 of that code barred any recovery 5from defendant
coemployee in the present civil action for negligence.

There are three relevant code references in this problem area.
They are sections 3600, 3601 and 3852 of the Labor Code. Because
the proper conditions for compensation were met in this case, plaintiff Saala collected workmen's compensation benefits under section
3600, the material part of which states:
Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of
any other liability whatsoever to any person . . .shall, without regard
to negligence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his
employees arising out of and in the course of the employment ....6

Plaintiff was able to receive her workmen's compensation benefits
under this section because, as the Supreme Court points out, it is the
established rule that,
Injuries sustained by an employee while going to or from his place of
work on premises owned and controlled by his employer are generally
deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment.
(Cal. Cas. Ind. Exch. v. Ind. Acc. Com., 21 Cal. 2d 751, 757, 135 P.2d
158, 162.) 7

In addition to the compensation provided by section 3600,
section 3852 provides that, "The claim of an employee for compensation does not affect his claim or right of action for all damages
proximately resulting from such injury or death against any person
Thus, section 3852 standing alone
other than the employer. . . .,,8
would give the plaintiff in this case a cause of action against the
defendant for his negligence.
However, section 3601 must also be considered as it limits the
broad scope of section 3852. Since plaintiff and defendant are coemployees, section 3601 bars plaintiff's recovery if the defendant was
acting within the scope of his employment. In part, this section
states:
Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover
such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of this division is .. .
the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the
employer or against any other employee of the employer acting within
the scope of his employment ....9
5 Saala v. McFarland, 63 A.C. 120, 121, 403 P.2d 400, 401, 45 Cal. Rptr. 144,
145 (1965).
6 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600.
7 63 A.C. 120, 122, 403 P.2d 400, 401, 45 Cal. Rptr. 144, 145 (1965).
8 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3852.
9 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3601. As enacted in 1937 it read: "Where the conditions of
compensation exist, the right to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of this division is, except as provided in section 3706, the exclusive remedy
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There are some exceptions under which even a co-employee acting
within the scope of his employment can be held personally responsible to the injured employee for his actions but these exceptions
are not material to this case.
In considering these statutory provisions, the Supreme Court
in Saala noted, "Essentially, the issue is whether 'acting within the
scope of his employment' in section 3601 has the same meaning as
'arising out of and in the course of the employment' in section
3600. " 1 Naturally, as the court points out, if the two phrases are
synonymous the specific immunity for the co-employee provided by
section 3601 would prevail over the more general third party
liability imposed by section 3852.
To answer this question the court looks at the situation from
an historical standpoint, pointing out that prior to the 1959 amendment to section 3601, which purportedly made workmen's compensation benefits an employee's exclusive remedy as against a
negligent co-employee, section 3852 preserved an employee's common law right to independently bring an action against a co-employee for a negligent injury. Baugh v. Rogers," a 1944 case, states,
"Our workmen's compensation laws were not designed to relieve one
other than the employer from any liability imposed by statute or by
common law."'

2

In the later case of Singleton v. Bonnesen,l8 a

defendant deputy sheriff was held to be personally liable to the
heirs of a negligently killed sheriff even though the negligence
causing the death occurred in the scope of the deputy's and the
sheriff's employment. 4 The court stated:
As coemployees we know of no rule prohibiting a suit by one against
the other for damages on account of negligence, even though their
common employer may be protected from such a suit by provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 1 5

The Supreme Court in Saala distinguishes the phrase "arising
out of and in the course of the employment" which includes activities
required in coming to and going from work while on property controlled by the employer, from the phrase "within the scope of his
employment" which the court defines by quoting,
against the employer for injury or death." This section was amended in 1959 to
read as it presently does.
10 63 A.C. 120, 123, 403 P.2d 400, 402, 45 Cal. Rptr. 144, 146 (1965).

11 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633, 152 A.L.R. 1043 (1944).
12 Id.
at 214, 148 P.2d at 641, 152 A.L.R. at 1053; accord, Lamoreux v.
San Diego etc. Ry. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 617, 311 P.2d 1 (1957).
13 131 Cal. App. 2d 327, 280 P.2d 481 (1955).
14 The court in Saala implies that the Singleton decision was the primary factor
motivating the Legislature to enact the 1959 amendment to § 3601.
15 131 Cal. App. 2d 327, 329, 280 P.2d 481, 482 (1955).
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Conduct is within the scope of employment only if the servant is
actuated to some extent by an intent to serve his master. (Rest. Agency
2d, § 235, comment a; accord, Dolinar v. Pedone, 63 Cal. App. 2d 169,
175, 146 P.2d 237 [3]; see Meyer v. Blackman, 59 Cal. 2d 668, 676
[51, 31 Cal. Rptr. 36, 381 P.2d 916.)16

With this distinction in mind, the court construes the 1959 amendment to section 3601 in the light of the case which, it says, stimulated
the amendment.
The presumption that an overall change is intended where a statute
is amended following a judicial decision (45 Cal. Jur. 2d 614) is given
its full effect if section 3601 as amended is construed to change the
law stated in those cases and exempt from civil liability only a coemthan those
ployee's actions within the scope of employment, rather
"arising out of and in the course of the employment.' 17
Saala should be read in the context of a Fourth District Court
case involving almost the same factual situation. In
Appeals
of
s
plaintiff was injured when the automobile in
Savage,'
v.
Mclvor
was struck by defendant's automobile while
riding
which she was
to leave their mutual employer's parking
preparing
both parties were
Plaintiff sued defendant for negligence
shift.
lot following a work
a
and defendant was granted summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed
to the Fourth District Court of Appeals which reversed this judgment stating:
...the affidavit and declaration which the defendants filed in support

of their motions [for summary judgment] . . .did not allege facts

from which it may be concluded as a matter of law that they were
scope of their employment at the time the
not acting within the
plaintiff was injured.19

Although the case was decided primarily on this procedural question,
the court had a significant amount to say on the substantive interpretation of the phrase "scope of his employment" as found in Labor
Code section 3601. It said:
Our conclusion is that section 3601 does not foreclose an action by
an employee against a coemployee for injuries sustained by the former
as a result of the negligent conduct of the latter merely because the
injuries sustained were compensable Under the Workmen's Compensation Statute; the fact that such an injury arose out of and in the course
of employment does not establish per se that the coemployee who
inflicted that injury was acting within the scope of his employment;
the phrase "scope of his employment" as used in that section to
describe the nature of the act of the coemployee whose conduct caused
16 63 A.C. 120, 124-25, 403 P.2d 400, 403, 45 Cal. Rptr. 144, 147 (1965).
17 Id. at 124, 403 P.2d at 403, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
18 220 Cal. App. 2d 128, 33 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1963).
'9 Id. at 138, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 746.

